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The Last Bar Examination (2009) 
Roger Bernhardt 
What struck me about the Property question in the most recent bar exam was its utter 
irrelevance to modern practice. It began with Ann, Betty, and Celia purchasing a condominium 
unit as joint tenants. Why it mattered that the property was a condominium was never shown, 
since nothing ever came of that fact—perhaps the questioner wanted to look modern, or instead 
hoped to confuse test-takers into thinking that that fact had something to do with some issue, 
although it did not. It would have been relevant to a real estate practice to ask whether an 
attorney should advise these three purchasers to take title as tenants in common rather than as 
joint tenants, given that they did not seem to be related, but joint tenancy was made a given in 
the question, eliminating any chance for giving advance legal advice about it. Examinees were 
asked to give judgments about completed legal facts rather than giving any advice to clients 
about structuring deals. 
What happened next in the problem is that Ann and Celia both executed deeds of their 
respective interests to Ed, each of them reserving life estates in themselves. Ann delivered and 
recorded her deed, but Celia recorded her deed “solely to protect her life estate interest” and then 
put it in a sealed envelope with instructions to deliver it back to her on demand or to Ed if she 
died; whereupon Ann later improperly mailed a copy of the deed to Ed. Finally, Ann and Celia 
are killed (apparently simultaneously) in a car accident! 
Facts of this sort would occur only in the worst of bad fiction—no such case could ever come 
across an attorney’s desk in the real world. Owners do not convey their property with reserved 
life estates, record them for special and illogical psychological reasons, place them in envelopes 
with peculiar instructions, and then have third parties copy and mail the copies contrary to those 
instructions. How does a student concoct an intelligent analysis of these facts that will reveal 
anything about his or her ability to handle actual problems of real people, i.e., to practice law? 
The first question was what interests Betty and Ed had as a result of those foregoing antics. 
Some features were easy. Ann’s conveyance severed the joint tenancy (with or without the 
reservation of a life estate and with or without the recording, especially after her death), so that 
Ed acquired her one third as a tenant in common. 
The disposition of Celia’s interest was more complicated; mainly, it depended on whether her 
deed was treated as delivered. The Daily Journal’s analysis concluded there was no delivery, so 
that Ed took nothing from it and Celia’s share went to Betty by survivorship. On the other hand, 
the Recorder’s answer opined that the delivery was effective—not because of the envelope but 
because of its recordation—so that Celia’s share did go to Ed. (Neither answer made anything 
out of the fact that Ed received only a copy of the deed in the mail.) Thus, one paper gave Ed one 
third while the other gave him two thirds. Should one of these positions be flunked? There was 
enough uncertainty about the Alice in Wonderland facts to make me hope that the graders take 
equally charitable views of both positions. 
The second and third questions involved some additional facts: Betty had originally moved out 
of the unit, but then she moved back in after Ann and Celia died; she thereafter operated a 
computer business in one of the bedrooms, rented out the other bedroom to a tenant, and paid for 
some “necessary repairs.” The questions then asked whether Ed could share in the rents Betty 
collected from the tenant or charge her rent for the computer business (Part 2) and be charged for 
contribution to the necessary repairs (Part 3). I regret that these issues were split up into separate 
questions because that had the effect of making it difficult to discuss how either set of claims 
might have offset the other. 
As far as Betty owing Ed (and ignoring how the original three owners ever expected to share a 
two-bedroom unit, or whether the condominium rules permitted doing business inside the unit), 
both model answers said that a cotenant could not be charged rent for personal occupancy and 
could be made to share rents collected from a third person—right answers, but hardly worth 
making into an essay question. (Who was entitled to the extra third of the tenant’s rent depended, 
of course, on how the earlier delivery question was resolved.) 
As for Ed’s liability for the “necessary repairs,” the Recorder said that because Betty was 
occupying the unit, she was “obligated to pay the cost of maintenance up to the fair market rental 
value” but could get contribution if her costs exceeded that number. The Daily Journal started by 
saying that Betty could get contribution for payments in excess of her prorata share of the 
repairs, but only if she had notified Ed of the need for repairs. I cannot say that I absolutely agree 
with either opinion, but both were as good as the meager facts of question deserved. I wish the 
examinees had been told what those payments covered, because Betty’s rights and remedies 
might vary depending on whether those bills were for, e.g., property taxes, or shared mortgage 
obligations, or physical repairs (or replacements), and whether she was seeking a money 
judgment against Ed, an offset against any accounting she had to make for the rent that came 
from the tenant, an equitable lien on Ed’s share of the property, or off the top in a partition. 
(Partition is what Betty and Ed certainly ought to be advised about, but that issue was probably 
too sensible for the bar examiners to inquire about.) 
At least a lot of students passed the previous bar, so the frivolity of the questions is not doing 
too much harm. 
Post Script 
• HUD has issued its final RESPA reform rule, with a new Good Faith Estimate form. See it at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/res/respa_hm.cfm. 
 
• As reported in 31 CEB RPLR 222 (Nov. 2008), CC §1675—the section that validates liquidated 
damage clauses in real estate sales contracts—has been amended (until 2014) to allow for 6 
percent rather than 3 percent “in a contract for the initial sale of a newly constructed attached 
condominium unit in a building over eight stories tall, containing 20 or more residential units, 
and located in a high-density infill development in a city, county, or city and county with 1,900 
residents or more per square mile, where the price is more than one million dollars ($1,000,000), 
as adjusted by the Department of Real Estate.” (Stats 2008, ch 665, AB 2020.) Does anybody 
know where that is or what it is all about?  
 
